**Security — App-Vault threat model, cryptography review, and trust framework** > App-Vault’s security posture in one document: threat model, cryptography stack, key management, audit status, and the references against which every claim on this site can be checked. Source: https://appvau.lt/security/ FILE S0 / SECURITY # Every claim on this site, checkable against a public source. A privacy app you cannot inspect is a privacy app you should not trust. This page lays out exactly what App-Vault protects against, what it does not protect against, and the references against which every cryptographic claim on appvau.lt can be independently verified. UPDATED · 2026-05-16 · REVIEWED BY APP-VAULT DEFINITION **App-Vault’s security posture** is the on-device application of standard, audited cryptography: AES-256-GCM for file confidentiality and integrity, PBKDF2-SHA256 for key derivation from a 5×5 pattern, and the iPhone Secure Enclave for key wrapping. The vault is designed so that without the exact user-drawn pattern, the encrypted container is mathematically indistinguishable from random data — and no party, including App-Vault, can recover the contents. THREAT MODEL ## Who App-Vault is designed to defend against — and who it is not. DEFENDS AGAINST - Casual access by a familiar party. A partner, child, or coworker picks up your unlocked phone. The Photos app shows nothing. The Hidden album shows nothing. App-Vault appears as a calculator (with the Calculator Launcher enabled). - A lost or stolen device. A finder unlocks the phone with a known passcode. The Photos app is empty of the protected material. The vault holds, because the vault key is the pattern — not the phone passcode. - Visual inspection at a border. An officer scrolls the camera roll. Sensitive documents are not in it. The vault, if visible at all, looks like a calculator. - Forensic extraction without the pattern. A forensic tool images the device. The vault container is on disk but cannot be decrypted without the pattern; even the catalog of file names is sealed. - Mass surveillance and server breach. We operate no server that holds vault contents. The vault directory is explicitly excluded from iCloud Backup and from iTunes/Finder backups; master keys are pinned to ThisDeviceOnly in the iOS Keychain. There is no off-device copy of your files for an attacker — or for a subpoena — to obtain. DOES NOT DEFEND AGAINST - A coerced unlock. If you are forced to draw the pattern, the vault opens. The Decoy Vault offers some plausible deniability, but a determined adversary who already knows two patterns exist is outside the model we sell. - A compromised device. If iOS itself is jailbroken or running an active spyware payload (Pegasus-class attacks), no app-level vault is sufficient. App-Vault is not a substitute for keeping iOS patched. - A forgotten pattern. There is no recovery process. If you forget the pattern and did not write down the recovery passphrase, the vault stays sealed. We cannot help. This is the design. - Lawful access requests. We comply with lawful orders. We hold no data about you, so an order produces nothing — but if a court orders you personally to unlock the vault, App-Vault provides no technical defense against that order. - A future cryptographic break. AES-256-GCM is the strongest practical cipher published today, but no cryptography is provably secure against future advances. We will update the stack when the wider cryptography community moves. REFERENCES ## Every cryptographic claim on this site links to a primary source. - AES-256-GCM is the file cipher [NIST FIPS 197 (AES) and NIST SP 800-38D (GCM mode) ↗](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.197-upd1.pdf) - AES-GCM AEAD construction [RFC 5116 — An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated Encryption ↗](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5116) - PBKDF2 key derivation, 600,000 iterations [NIST SP 800-132 and OWASP Password Storage Cheat Sheet (2026 guidance) ↗](https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-132.pdf) - Apple Secure Enclave key wrapping [Apple Platform Security guide — Secure Enclave chapter ↗](https://support.apple.com/guide/security/secure-enclave-sec59b0b31ff/web) - CryptoKit framework usage [Apple Developer Documentation — CryptoKit ↗](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/cryptokit) - iCloud client-side encryption [Apple Advanced Data Protection white paper ↗](https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212520) AUDIT STATUS ## Independent review App-Vault’s cryptography stack is built on Apple’s CryptoKit framework, which is itself open-sourced under the Swift project and continuously reviewed by Apple’s security engineering team and external cryptographers. Our wrapping code — the small layer between user patterns and the framework — is the part that benefits most from independent review. We have scheduled a third-party cryptographic audit with an established firm. We will publish the audit report in full on this page when it completes. Until then, our Security Architecture document is available on request to journalists, academic researchers, and serious customer-side reviewers — write to [security@appvau.lt](mailto:security@appvau.lt). ## Responsible disclosure If you discover a security issue in App-Vault, write to [security@appvau.lt](mailto:security@appvau.lt) with a clear reproduction. We respond within 72 hours, acknowledge within 5 business days, and credit reporters in the patched release notes unless asked not to. We do not yet run a paid bug bounty. We will acknowledge significant findings with a public credit and, where possible, a thank-you payment. ## What we have not done We have not been audited yet. We have not been formally certified for HIPAA, SOC 2, ISO 27001, or any other compliance framework — App-Vault is a consumer privacy utility, not an enterprise tool. We do not make compliance claims we cannot back. If you require a certified vault for a regulated workflow (medical imaging, legal e-discovery, classified material), App-Vault is the wrong tool. Use a certified system. GET STARTED ## Seal the vault. Free to download. The free tier holds one file. Premium removes the limit — Weekly from $3.99 or Yearly from $29.99 with a 7-day free trial. [Open App-Vault on iPhone](https://appvau.lt/download/) --- HTML version: https://appvau.lt/security/ Structured data for this site: https://appvau.lt/api/v1/openapi.json · https://appvau.lt/llms.txt Free to quote and reuse with a link back to the source URL above (CC BY 4.0).